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Abstract
Objects Deliberate termination of life of newborns (invol-
untary euthanasia) with meningomyelocele (MMC) is
practiced openly only in the Netherlands. ‘Unbearable and
hopeless suffering’ is the single most cited criterion for this
termination, together with the notion that ‘there are no other
proper medical means to alleviate this suffering’. In this
paper, both (and other) statements are questioned, also by
putting them in a broader perspective.
Methods First, a historical overview of the treatment of
newborns with MMC is presented, concentrating on the
question of selection for treatment. Second, a thorough anal-
ysis is made of the criteria used for life termination. Third, a
case of a newborn with a very severe MMC is presented as a
‘reference case’.
Conclusion ‘Unbearable and hopeless suffering’ cannot be
applied to newborns with MMC. They are not ‘terminally
ill’ and do have ‘prospects of a future’. In these end-of-life
decisions, ‘quality of life judgments’ should not be applied.
When such a newborn is not treated, modern palliative care
always will suffice in eliminating possible discomfort.
There is no reason whatsoever for active life-termination
of these newborns.
Keywords Meningomyelocele . Newborn . Suffering .
Pain . Quality of life . Termination of life . Palliative care .
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“An infant with spina bifida cannot ‘suffer unbearably’.
Infants might be able to experience unbearable pain,
but spina bifida does not cause it.” (Chervenak 2006)
Introduction and historical overview of the treatment
of newborns with MMC
Before the 1960s, most newborns with meningomyelocele
(MMC) were not treated given the consideration that it was
in the best interests of the child and family, in most cases
resulting in the death of the child. They died from sepsis,
meningitis, hydrocephalus, or renal failure. Contraindica-
tions to operation included “hydrocephalus, irreparable
deformities, paralysis of the sphincters, complete paraplegia
or any ulcerative process in the region of the spina bifida”
[22]. The influence of the surgical approaches since the
1960s allowed gradually effective early treatment of the
complicating hydrocephalus, resulting in many patients
surviving into childhood. Early treatment of the spinal
lesion and hydrocephalus resulted in decreased mortality
and morbidity [66]. ‘Wait and see’ changed into active
treatment. Lorber (1971) published the first large series of
patients treated between 1959 and 1969 [44]. He found that
only 7% of the survivors had less than “crippling dis-
ability”, “most had a quality of life inconsistent with self-
respect, learning capacity, happiness, and even marriage”.
To “spare children and families prolonged suffering” he
proposed the well-known ‘Lorber selection criteria’. These
four major adverse criteria are: severe paraplegia, gross
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enlargement of the head, severe kyphosis or scoliosis and
associated gross congenital anomalies (such as heart
disease) or major birth injuries. No active treatment was
advised for children who had one or any combination of
these criteria. The result of this proposed selection was to
treat only those with lesions on lumbar and sacral level
without any other major complication. Others would,
according to Lorber, “die quickly”.
Since the Lorber era there have been tremendous
successes in the treatment of patients with MMC [48, 50].
Over the last 30 years, continual progress has not only been
made in the neurosurgical (closure of the back defect,
shunting, or endoscopic techniques for the complicating
hydrocephalus, treatment of tethered spinal cord and Chiari
II malformation), orthopedic (treatment of scoliosis, cor-
rection of club feet), urological (preserving normal renal
function, securing social continence), and psychosocial
treatment of patients with MMC, but also in support for
independence by modern rehabilitation programs.
Nevertheless, early decision making (for restriction) and
selective treatment of newborns with MMC is still propa-
gated [27, 69], resulting in approvals but also in critiques
[7, 23, 41, 42, 49, 79].
What is considered ethical at one time, or in one country,
can be considered unethical or unacceptable at/in another.
The ethical debate on treating children with MMC is unique
in the sense that these children will/can have a life of
substantial and sometimes severe physical disability but
often with normal mentation, this in contrast to severely
psycho-motor handicapped children. Children and adults
with MMC can be aware of their deficits.
Lorber (1971) stated that untreated children will die
quickly [44]. However, he delivered the children anticon-
vulsants to prevent seizures, opioids and chloral hydrate to
prevent pain [25]. One pediatrician has said that these
untreated children received the same care and attention as
others, being fed and loved, but they also received 60 mg/
kg body weight of chloral hydrate, four times a day. This
was being administered for pain, but the children who were
operated on did not receive this regimen. Another physician
just said: we don’t feed them [79]. Consequently, the
duration of life seems to depend on the attitude of the
responsible doctor.
In the United States, untreated children were not given
morphine or anticonvulsant drugs and were fed every 4 h,
resulting in many ‘survivors’ with severe handicaps. On the
contrary, in the United Kingdom the children died quickly.
However, the question remains if these children were really
in pain or suffered from seizures; perhaps not.
Not all physicians did follow the ‘Lorber criteria’, but
treated all children unselectively, regardless of the level of
the lesion. This approach resulted in multidisciplinary
MMC clinics and MMC teams. The nonselective treatment
of newborns with MMC started in the early 1970s and
gives us a picture of long-term outcome of newborns with
MMC [4, 9, 32, 48, 52] and also of the quality of life and
health status of adults with spina bifida [58, 63]. Some
physicians became bitter after treating children with MMC
for years [2].
In the early 1980s, the ‘Baby Jane Doe (‘Stony Brook
baby’) case resulted in the United States in an ethical debate
on the prospect physicians make about the future life of
handicapped children born with MMC. This girl was born
with MMC, complicated with hydrocephalus (although
diagnosed by the attending physician as microcephalic).
The team of physicians told the parents that the child would
spend her life “lying in bed, bottle fed....She would expe-
rience no joy, sadness or any such emotion except response
to pain and would develop no cognitive skills. She might
survive for 20 years” [51].
Based on the given information, the parents agreed not
to treat their child. However, the physicians turned out to be
wrong. Although the child developed meningitis, sepsis,
and hydrocephalus (which were only treated to some
extent), she survived all these complications, was taken
home, became ambulating and communicating on an
acceptable level of intelligence, all this despite the partial
treatment [24, 25].
After the introduction of alpha feto-protein (AFP)
screening in the late 1980s (followed by amniocentesis)
and ultrasound diagnosis, many fetus with MMC can now
be detected early in pregnancy. Nowadays, after being
counseled, most pregnant couples decide to abort a fetus
with MMC (in many Western countries resulting in an
abortion rate of 95%, resulting in fewer children with MMC
born [13, 14, 53]), seen by many as ‘prevention’ of MMC.
But what advice should neonatologists, neurologists, or
neurosurgeons give the parents when a full-term child with
MMC is born? Is the advice not to treat, or to terminate the
life of the newborn deliberately (involuntary euthanasia) an
ethically defendable one?
Deliberate and active termination of life in newborns
with MMC is only discussed and practiced in an open way
in the Netherlands [35, 38_40, 71_76, 78]. The judgment
“unbearable and hopeless suffering” of the newborn and
“the prospect of unbearable and hopeless suffering” in the
future, together with the notion that there is “no other
proper medical means to alleviate the unbearable suffering”
form the basis for this decision [73]. Because these
judgments are questioned, and to quantify the level of
discomfort in these neonates, the “Rotterdam Prospective
Study on Discomfort in Newborns with Spina Bifida” was
started in 2005 in the Erasmus Medical Center (EMC)–
Sophia Children’s Hospital (Rotterdam, the Netherlands).
Although in due time the results of this study will be pub-
lished, some important aspects will already be addressed in
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this paper by elaborating on the case of a newborn with a
very severe form of MMC and hydrocephalus.
Deliberate termination of life in newborns with MMC
in The Netherlands
The Dutch neurosurgeon De Lange analyzed the selection
criteria for treatment of newborns with MMC in the
Netherlands already in the 1970s [41, 42]. It became clear
from an enquiry among Dutch neurosurgeons that a number
of them advised against treatment on the basis of physical
handicaps alone. Others regarded the expected mental
abilities as an overruling factor. When basic communication
skills could be expected, most children were treated. At the
time, deliberate termination of life was never practiced. De
Lange (1970) also concluded “If we were to decide that in
our opinion patients with spina bifida who are below a
certain level of physical or mental ability should not be kept
alive, it should be illogical not to apply the same rules to
other categories of handicap.” [41]
In the 1980s, the Dutch ethicist Hertogh (1988)
published his paper “Ethical considerations on the dilem-
mas caused by the selective treatment of newborns with
MMC” in the leading Dutch medical Journal [30]. He
elaborated on the philosophical and ethical aspects of the
Lorber selection criteria: “The objective medical fact of a
physical shortcoming is something completely different
than the subjective reality of ‘being-handicapped’ itself.
Studies have shown that living as ‘being-handicapped’ does
not correlate directly to the severity of physical short-
comings. The question as to what can be considered as an
acceptable handicap transgresses, in other words, the scope
of what can be ascertained in a medical-scientific way and
this, therefore, refers inevitably to the subjective experi-
ence. It has to be questioned whether the quantification of
qualitative aspects of medical treatment perhaps offers
nothing more than pretence-rationality, caused by the used
decisive terminology. In conclusion: up to date the criterion
‘quality of life’ appears to be more deceptive than clarifying
in the medical decision about the possible continued
existence of a newborn with spina bifida.” [30] He also
referred to the ethics of the philosopher Levinas: “Ethos
cannot be founded in scientific facts; it is founded in the
human relationship itself. Mutual dependency, which is
characteristic for ‘human being’, makes us responsible just
by itself and therefore defines ‘the disposition of ethos’ as a
rational fact. This relationship always precedes facts
themselves.”[30] In other words: human beings, just
because of the fact that they are human beings, have an
intrinsic and mutual responsibility for the well-being of
others, this responsibility itself preceding physical qualities.
This thoughtful paper, however, was not given much
attention in the Dutch medical press.
In 1993, baby Rianne was born in a small town in the
Netherlands with a MMC at level of the first and second
lumbar vertebrae complicated by hydrocephalus. The lower
limbs were deformed and paralyzed. Computed tomogra-
phy (CT) scan of the head confirmed the diagnosis of
severe hydrocephalus. On the first day of her life, the
decision was made by the pediatrician and the gynecologist
in consultation with a neurologist, neurosurgeon, and pastor
not to operate the back lesion and the hydrocephalus. On
the fourth day of her life, at the request of the parents, the
gynecologist Prins terminated the life of the baby by a
lethal injection. In an interview, Prins stated [37]: “Closing
the defect and fighting infections with maximal treatment
could enable the child to survive for years. No one knows
how long”. On the question of what an operation could
have accomplished, Prins answered: “The defect would
have been closed. The possibility of secondary infection,
which was an immediate threat to her life, would have been
diminished. Her brain pressure would rise, however, and it
would have been necessary to implant a shunt”. On the
question of how he would calculate the benefit of treatment,
he answered: “It (the operation) would have prolonged her
life without treating the symptoms and consequences of the
defect because the operation would not have alleviated
them. The operation would only have minimized the
possibility of infection, but it would have created the
necessity for repeated operations involving the shunt and
the urological system because there were obstructions in the
passage between the kidney and the bladder. Her brain
damage was so extensive and the possibility of movement
so limited. She would never have been able to walk or sit
unsupported; she would have been incontinent in her
bladder and bowel. There was sensory damage as well;
she could not feel sensation in her lower body. She would
have started life with repeated operations, need for
persistent medical attention, no possibility for self-support,
and very low communicative ability” [37]. As a definition
of a severe handicap he stated: “This can relate to the
estimated possibility of becoming happy” [37], and he
further referred to the Dutch Association of Paediatrics
who developed criteria, including the lack of capacity to
communicate, lack of capacity for self-maintenance, persis-
tent need for medical assistance, and the existence of pain.
All these criteria grouped together gave a picture of the
baby’s quality of life. Because most of the criteria were
satisfied, the baby was considered to be severely handi-
capped, resulting in a very poor expected quality of life; the
child was not operated on because of the severity of the
expected handicaps.
On the necessity of life-termination, Prins (1997)
explained: “The baby was in a great deal of pain and the
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normal analgesics did not work well. So it would have been
necessary to use narcotic analgesics—morphine-like drugs.
And that would have caused depression of consciousness. It
is clear to me that the use of such drugs would have
depressed normal functioning—behavior, expressions, and
sensibility. Using morphine-like drugs would have caused
a situation of floating between heaven and earth. It would
have been dishonest and should be considered as unethical
and unjust. There is no moral difference between killing
and withholding useless medical treatment. There is an
emotional difference. And there should not be a legal
difference” [37].
Although elements of the offense of murder were
proven, the physician was acquitted based on the unavoid-
able conflict of duties between his duty to prolong life and
his duty to alleviate unbearable suffering [26].
In 1996, three Dutch child neurologists and one neu-
rosurgeon questioned in the leading Dutch medical journal
the active termination of life of newborns with MMC [59].
They defended the opinion that (severe) handicapped life
could also be meaningful. Deliberate termination of life was
not considered appropriate; sedation and the delivery of
opioids were mandatory in the case of suffering. Not
treating a child with MMC should not result in a more
severe handicapped life; the decision to withhold treatment
was only made in the case of severe pulmonary or cardiac
complications with the prospect of early death. The possible
suffering of the parents should not be an indication for
deliberate termination of the life of a newborn with MMC.
They referred to the study of Steinbok et al. (1992) [68] for
their argument that the life of children and adults with
(severe) MMC can be meaningful [59].
In 2003, the Dutch physician/medical ethicist Van de
Vathorst stated that whenever it is decided not to treat a
defective newborn, deliberate termination of the life of this
newborn should be regarded as a moral demand, based on
the principle of ‘mercy’ [72]. She illustrated her arguments
with a case of a newborn with a thoracic MMC. Interestingly
enough, the life of this child was not terminated. It died by
itself, a few days old, because of pulmonary insufficiency.
Although she received a national award for this paper, it
resulted in several disapproving letters to the editor.
In January 2005, two pediatricians, one physician, and
one pediatric neurologist reported on the deliberate termi-
nation of life of 22 newborns in the Netherlands between
1997 and 2004 [73]. Explaining the fact that all 22 cases
were newborns with MMC and hydrocephalus, Verhagen
et.al. referred to the ‘baby Rianne case’, stating that “her
life was dominated by unbearable suffering” and “since this
case it is established that newborns with a severe form of
spina bifida do suffer severely” [73].
According to the authors, the deliberate termination of
life was necessary because of the presence of “unbearable
and hopeless suffering, acutely and long-term, with no
other proper medical means of alleviating the suffering”
[73]. All parents consented to the proposal of termination of
life; in four cases, they explicitly requested for it. For the
public prosecutor, the termination of life was acceptable if
four requirements were properly fulfilled: (1) the presence
of hopeless and unbearable suffering, (2) consent of the
parents to termination of life, (3) consultation of another
physician or of a multidisciplinary MMC team, and (4) a
proper and careful execution of the termination. These four
criteria eventually became the cornerstone of the so-called
‘Groningen Protocol’, a protocol meant to insure that the
decision for life termination, the executing itself, together
with reporting to the legal authorities, are all conducted in a
proper way. This protocol was approved and adopted by the
Dutch Association of Paediatrics in 2005.
The motivation for the judgement of ‘unbearable and
hopeless suffering’ in the 22 cases of spina bifida was [73]:
1. ‘suffering’ (acute and chronic pain, physical pain) (100%
of the 22 cases);
2. the ‘lack on ability to live or do things independently’
as the result of ‘severely disturbed sensomotoric
development’ (100% of the 22 cases);
3. the ‘lack of possibility to verbal and non-verbal com-
munication’ (82% of the 22 cases);
4. ‘the prospect to dependency to the medical circuit as
the result of frequent hospital admissions and oper-
ations’ (77% of the 22 cases)
5. the ‘life expectation’ (‘the burden of severe suffering
increases by a longer life span’) (in 59% of the 22 cases).
None of the cases led to prosecution; all cases were
found to be in accordance with good medical practice.
This article of Verhagen et al. (2005a) gave rise to only a
few reactions in the Netherlands. Kompanje et al. (2005)
[38] questioned the validity of ‘unbearable suffering’ as a
useful criterion. They also stated that with the use of modern
palliative care, ‘suffering’ always can be dealt with in an
adequate way, as did Laane (2005) [39, 40]. De Jong (2006)
[35] made a plea for ‘letting them die’ instead of ‘making
them die’ in the case of an untreated newborn with MMC.
On request of the editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, Verhagen and Sauer (2005) published another
article concerning the Groningen protocol and the 22 cases
[75] and a similar article appeared in Pediatrics [76]. The
reactions in the international medical press were mostly
negative. In his article “Control of suffering on the slippery
slope of care” in the Lancet, Feudtner (2005) also addressed
the poor quality and the insufficiency of the offered
palliative care and questioned whether legalization of active
termination of life might not lead to the abuse of it [21].
Saugstad (2005) stated in the Acta Paediatrica: “Neo-
natologists must be extremely careful not to start on the
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slippery slope ending in the Dutch practice of euthanasia of
newborns. I would strongly warn against this attitude,
which I find non-compatible with Western humanistic
traditions” [61]. Jotkowitz and Glick (2006), in the Journal
of Medical Ethics, were worried: “We feel an important line
has been crossed if the international medical community
consents to the active euthanasia of severely ill infants and
are concerned about the extension of the policy to other at
risk groups” [36]. Bondi et. al. (2006), in Pediatrics, made
a plea for an open discussion: “Rather than performing an
in-depth examination of the philosophical, ethical, and
moral implications of this protocol, the authors focus on its
technical details and acceptability within the European
medical community. The Groningen Protocol centers not on
patient self-determination, but instead on the perception of
the patient’s current and future suffering. Although the
authors note that an open discussion of these issues is
‘extremely important,” they fail to initiate it. We hope that
thoughtful ethicists and legislators will initiate the
open discussion that the authors advocate” [8]. In their
article ‘Why the Groningen Protocol should be rejected’,
Chervenak et al. (2006) concluded that: “The justification
they offer is woefully inadequate. It relies on appeals to the
concepts of “hopeless and unbearable suffering,” the “best
interests of the patient,” and “medical-ethical values,” but it
never explains these concepts, and it gives no ethical
argument for their clinical application. In fact, not only is
no argument for the Protocol given, none can hope to
succeed. The Groningen Protocol should therefore be
rejected as the basis for obstetric and neonatal practice in
The Netherlands and throughout the world.” (11)
Manninen (2006a), finally, made an important contribu-
tion with her article “A case for justified non-voluntary
active euthanasia: exploring the ethics of the Groningen
Protocol” in the Journal of Medical Ethics [45]. She made a
thoughtful plea for the ethics of the Groningen Protocol:
“What the Groningen Protocol proposes to do is both
ethical and also the most human alternative for these
suffering and dying infants.” Newborns eligible for this
protocol “do face no future at all—that is, the infants must
be terminally ill”, “will die soon no matter what actions
doctors undertake, modern medicine can do nothing to save
them”, “have no prospects, have crossed the threshold into
a comparatively valueless state of existence”, “will spend
the remainder of their lives in a chronic state of nothing but
pain and suffering” [45]. Interestingly enough, on Novem-
ber 23 an additional letter of herself, “Regarding the
Groningen Protocol” [46], was published in the same
journal. Some key passages of this letter: “It has recently
been brought to my attention that the physicians of the
Groningen Hospital who originally proposed the Groningen
Protocol have proposed to violate the first two conditions of
the original Groningen Protocol: (1) The suffering must be
so severe that the infant has no prospects for a future; (2)
There is no possibility that the infant can be cured or
alleviated of her affliction with medication or surgery. For
example, Dr. Verhagen has maintained that the Protocol
could apply to infants that are not necessarily terminally ill,
but nevertheless may face a compromising future. In
essence, the Groningen Protocol has begun to make quality
of life judgments. If the Groningen physicians have
commenced making quality of life judgments, they have
strayed away from the original purpose of the Protocol, and
this, I believe, may have concerning ethical implications.
As I write in my paper: “...the Groningen Protocol does not
make quality of life judgments, and it is because of this
very important requirement that the Protocol strikes me as
humane and morally permissible, for it seems utterly
vicious to extend the life of a suffering infant with no
prospects for a future. If the infant did have a possible
future ahead of her, I would be more hesitant to condone a
legal practice that begins to make quality of life judgments,
for such judgments can be, and have been, subject to error.”
[46] In her opinion, in these end-of-life decisions ‘quality
of life judgments’ should not be made and, in a way, with
this letter she also highlights the inconsistencies in the
reports by Verhagen et al. Being of crucial importance, the
subject of ‘quality of life judgments’ will be discussed more
extensively in paragraphs 4 and 5.
Finally, in 2006, in The Netherlands a national multi-
disciplinary expert review committee has been appointed.
In the case of active termination of the life of a newborn,
the responsible physician is supposed to inform this
committee, which then has to determine whether the criteria
for life termination have been met. Subsequently this
committee has to advise the Public Persecutor’s Office
(OM) whether the physician should be prosecuted or not.
Although such a committee seems to guarantee more
certainty, it can be doubted, however, if this ‘checking on
afterhand’ is of much value for the newborn in question. It
seems to be more sensible to change this procedure to a
‘checking on beforehand’. Legally, this might perhaps be
difficult to establish, but it seems not justifiable that legal
procedures themselves do dominate the question of appro-
priateness of life termination; errors in judgment being
unacceptable (cf. the level of certainty required for a death
penalty in crime in, e.g., the USA).
Analysis of the mentioned criteria for non-treatment
and deliberate termination of life
Suffering
The actual presence of acute unbearable and hopeless
suffering of the newborn and the prospect of future/chronic
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unbearable and hopeless suffering as the result of handi-
caps, pain, and discomfort is the most given argument for
deliberate termination of life in neonates with MMC. In the
recent Dutch series, this suffering was stated to be present
in 100% of the 22 cases [73, 75, 76].
Acute pain Not any convincing evidence can be found in
the literature that newborns with MMC actually do suffer
from untreatable pain in the days after birth caused by their
back lesion or by other complications. A pediatric surgeon
who devoted much of his professional life of more than
30 years to the treatment of those who have been born with
spina bifida stated: “I personally have seen little evidence
that the babies have pain in the newborn period, nor have I
found them unable to sleep.” [79] Delight and Goodall
(1988; 1990) [17, 18] studied the experiences of parents of
44 children born with MMC, all managed without any
surgery. All 44 children died before their first birthday.
Only a quarter of them did require some medication such as
analgesics and anticonvulsants; half of them were given
drugs in the dying period. Analgesics were given in a low
dose simply to enhance their quality of life [17, 18].
Chronic pain The literature on chronic pain in MMC is
scarce. The first systematic examinations of the nature and
prevalence of pain in children with MMC was published
in 2005 [12]. Headache is not uncommon in adults with
MMC and is associated with hydrocephalus. In this series,
56% of 68 patients reported experiencing pain once a week
or more frequent. Of the shunted children, 88% reported
headaches compared to 79% of the children without a shunt
[12]. Children in this study reported frequent and some-
times intense pain at multiple locations associated with the
physiological sequelae, equipment usage, and medical
management of the disability. The authors concluded that
children with spina bifida frequently report clinically
significant, under-recognized and untreated pain, and they
propagated proper care and adequate medical management
of these children. In another series, 55% of 42 patients
underwent investigations for one or more episodes of
chronic headache due to shunt malfunction, ventriculos-
tomy failure, or symptomatic Arnold–Chiari malformation
[20]. Although all these problems sometimes can be fairly
serious, the notion of ‘unbearable and hopeless suffering’ is
never mentioned.
The ‘lack of ability to live or do things independently’
as the result of ‘severely disturbed senso-motoric
development’
The second argument for unbearable and hopeless suffering
is the prospect of lack of ability to live or do things inde-
pendently as the result of severely disturbed senso-motoric
development experienced by the patient in childhood,
puberty, and adult life [73].
McLone reported in 1982 the results of the unselective
treatment of 100 consecutive newborns with MMC [48].
After a follow-up period of 3.5 to 7 years there were 86
survivors. He concluded that the total percentage of children
who could be independent and competitive is approaching
70–80%. Hunt and Oakeshott (2003) [32] and Oakeshott
and Hunt (2003) [52] studied the outcome in 117 unse-
lected and actively treated patients with MMC at age 35.
The patients were treated between 1963 and 1971 without
any attempt at selection. Forty-two patients had a severe
lesion at a sensory level above Th11, 30 of whom died,
most before their first birthday. They died mostly of cardio-
respiratory or renal failure, hydrocephalus, or CNS infec-
tion. Two of the 12 survivors live independently, drive cars,
and have an open employment; six have an IQ >80. In
another study [62], 29% out of 60 adolescents with spina
bifida had the lesion at a high lumbar or thoracic level. The
authors studied the quality of life in these patients. They
concluded that there were no significant relationships
between the level of the lesion or spina bifida severity
and the overall quality of life, which appeared to be 70 to
80 on a 100-point scale; both patients and their parents
view the overall quality of life positively [62].
Besides these results, criteria such as ‘living indepen-
dently’ or ‘doing things independently’ can be confusing
when deciding about the future life of vital newborns. Most
people who do live a meaningful life are dependent on
others or interdependent on each other. In fact, interdepen-
dency and especially the willingness to care for other
(perhaps dependent) people can be considered as a criterion
of a truly civilized society, certainly so when this means to
offer ‘something for nothing’ (this being real mercy).
The ‘lack of possibility of verbal and non-verbal
communication’
In 18 of the 22 studied Dutch cases, it was predicted
“(future) communication of and with the child would not be
possible, neither verbally nor nonverbally” [73]. In other
words, these babies were predicted to be or to become in a
state of deep coma or in a persistent vegetative state.
Neither of these states of very severe disturbed conscious-
ness, however, is applicable to a newborn with MMC and
hydrocephalus. Furthermore, several publications concern-
ing the level of mental functioning of adults with MMC have
been published [3, 4, 9, 32, 33, 47, 67, 68, 70]. Intellectual
development varies between normal IQ (this being the case
in 60% [9, 68] to 70% [32] of the studied population) and
severe mental disability, but the predicted complete absence
of the possibility to communicate is never mentioned. On
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the contrary: “Virtually all infants with spina bifida are
capable of meaningful human relationships, independent
of the level of the lesion. Indeed, most are of normal intel-
ligence” [23]. Aside from this incorrect medical description
there are some other important aspects that need to be
highlighted. When all communication is claimed to be im-
possible, one wonders by what methods at all (the amount
of) suffering can be established. Furthermore, when a person
is in such a state of deep coma or in a persistent vegetative
state, there simply is no cognitive experience whatsoever,
also not of (unbearable) suffering. This was confirmed in a
recent conviction of the Dutch Medical Disciplinary Com-
mittee against a general practitioner who euthanized a
comatose patient; the ground of the verdict being “because
of the comatose state there was no longer any question of
unbearable suffering nor any question of euthanasia” [15].
‘The prospect of dependency to the medical circuit
as the result of frequent hospital admissions and operations’
It seems hardly possible to quantify this criterion in such a
way that it can be used to justify life termination of vital
newborns. When compared to persons with other congenital
malformations or congenital diseases or some acquired dis-
eases, patients with MMC do not appear to need substan-
tially more medical care than, e.g., patients with intracranial
tumors or with chronic diseases such as severe pulmonary,
cardiac, or neurological disorders. Furthermore, the claim of
Verhagen (2004) that “this child would have to undergo at
least 60 operations in the course of a year to temporarily
alleviate its problems” [71] again cannot be substantiated: a
retrospective survey of treated newborns with MMC over
2 years in the Sophia Children Hospital showed that three
to four operations were needed in their first year of life.
‘Life expectation’ (‘the burden of severe suffering increases
by a longer life span’)
It is clear that the longer a patient lives, the more medical
care will be needed in a quantitative way. Whether this
means that this will affect the experienced quality of life in
a negative way remains totally unclear and cannot be
predicted. Furthermore, patients with MMC do require
relatively much of their medical care in their first two
decades, this steadily decreasing when they grow older and
when disabilities and coping with these disabilities are
gradually stabilized.
Can ‘suffering’ be applied as a reasonable criterion
in newborns?
Suffering, especially the ‘unbearable and hopeless’ aspects
of it, is a complex psychosocial phenomenon and by
definition strictly individualized: only the individual itself
can experience the existence, the intensity, and hopeless-
ness of it. Others (parents, physicians, nurses) can only to
some degree make an estimation of it. It is therefore
tentative whether ‘suffering’ can be applied to newborns at
all. What is possible, however, is to establish quite precisely
the level of ‘(dis)comfort’ of a newborn by making use of
standardized score charts such as the Comfort score and the
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) (see below).
The Dutch physician Beijk(1998) stated it as follows:
“suffering will be interpreted by every patient, by every
doctor, and by every other involved person in a different
way and therefore can lead to completely different con-
clusions. The bearableness is especially dependent on
personal and environmental factors; it is all about the
subjective experience of the individual itself who is
suffering, about the durableness of the suffering, and about
the wish to die” [6]. In 2005, in his Ph.D. thesis, also
Hamburg (physician and jurist) concluded “for the criterion
‘suffering’ there are no objective or scientifically validated
criteria available, with the consequence of decisions of life-
termination being dependent of the subjective judgment of
the doctor, leading to inconsistent decisions” [29]. There-
fore, according to Hamburg, “in a time of evidence-based
medicine ‘suffering’ is not acceptable anymore” [29], as
also was suggested by Kompanje et al. (2005) [38].
Although Beijk and Hamburg are referring to the practice
of euthanasia (which in the Netherlands is strictly referring
to competent patients wishing to die), their statements are
the more applicable to newborns, as in these cases
predictions are being made about future suffering of others.
According to Chervenak et al. (2006): “An infant with
spina bifida cannot have and therefore cannot have lost the
ability to realize intentions, desires, and hopes for the
future; it can feel pain but cannot ‘suffer’ as a psychosocial
phenomenon” [11]. Laane (2005a) came to the same
conclusion: “having no biographical consciousness, ‘suf-
fering’ cannot be applied to newborns [39]. To date, it is
unclear why this improper use of ‘suffering’ still continues
in this debate.
Can physicians predict quality of life?
Counseling the parents
In a time in which most fetuses with MMC will be detected
by AFP and amniocentesis or by ultrasound diagnosis (in
most cases being followed by iatrogenic abortion), the birth
of a newborn with MMC is increasingly becoming a rare
phenomenon [14]. The decision to terminate a pregnancy in
the case of a fetus with MMC is usually made shortly after
the diagnosis. It can be questioned whether there is enough
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time for proper counseling about the prospect of living with
spina bifida, as a patient and also as parents. Freeman
(1998) stated: “Decisions are made by the parents without
knowledge of the child’s future; without knowing whether
the child will have minimal deficit and walk with only short
leg braces or walk with no braces at all, and without
awareness of whether this child will have a thoracic lesion
with high paraplegia and spend his or her life in a wheel-
chair. Few parents at that stage in the pregnancy know
much about spina bifida or about what life will be like for
that child and for that family. In other words, these rarely
are informed decisions” [25]. He points in the same
direction concerning physician experience: “Today, few
younger physicians have experience with the decision-
making process for spina bifida either before or after birth.
Thus, physician advisors will lack experience with the joys
of caring for a child, even a handicapped child, as well as
experience with the pains and problems. They will have
little experience with the feelings of the handicapped chil-
dren themselves. With the lack of experience, how should
the physician counsel? On what basis can the inexperienced
physician advise uninformed parents? What decision should
the parents make?” [25]
In their article “Tell the truth about spina bifida,” Bruner
and Tulipan(2004) also showed their worries about the
quality of counseling: “Unfortunately, many healthcare
professionals are equally ignorant of the current prognosis
of children with spina bifida who have ready access to
comprehensive care in a modern multidisciplinary clinic.
As a result, much of the information initially provided to
couples with a newly diagnosed fetus is biased and mis-
leading. As medical ethicists Bliton and Zaner at Vanderbilt
University Medical Center observed, “To date we have met
and held intense conversations with more than 150 pregnant
women and their partners. Many times, couples admitted, the
initial counseling they received from their obstetrician was
slanted—both against disability and toward termination of
pregnancy. What they remembered was how the initial
obstetric consultation portrayed as grim a picture as possible
about their future child’s prognosis.” [10]
The statements of Verhagen et al. (2005) mentioned
earlier, together with other incorrect predictions (“these
newborns have no prospect of a future and no chance to
survive at all; are barely able to breathe”, “these children
face a life of agonizing pain that cannot be alleviated by
any proper medical means”, “the child would suffer such
unbearable pain that it has to be constantly anaesthetized”
[71], that “they all have spina bifida of the most severe
form at level of the neck and all have non-functioning
kidneys” [78]), unfortunately seem to confirm these
worries, also in counseling the parents of a newborn with
MMC. To date, it is not clear why such incorrect infor-
mation is presented to parents, colleagues, and society as a
whole. When parents are told that communication with and
of their child never will be possible, that their child will
face a life of agonizing pain and will suffer unbearably, that
this suffering cannot be alleviated by any means, that
annually at least 60 operations will be needed to offer some
(but only temporary) relief, then these parents are left
without any hope and their consent/decision to non-
treatment, or to active termination of life, almost can be
predicted. However, in such situations the fundamental
concept of ‘informed decisions’ is obviously violated.
Does the level of the lesion matter?
Does the level of the lesion determine the amount and
severity of disturbances? In general, the higher up the spine
the lesion is, the more likely are severe neurological
disabilities to be found. Cervical lesions often do not
contain neural tissue and are simple meningoceles. At lower
levels (thoracic and especially lumbar), the converse is true:
the infant nearly always being (partially) paralyzed below
the level of the lesion, the cord showing the classical
features of dysplasia [66]. However, the extent of handicaps
that a person with MMC experiences is determined not by
the site of the lesion, but almost entirely by the neurological
deficit. Verhoef (2005) concluded that young adults with a
mild form of spina bifida (and subsequently with few
disabilities), did experience their disabilities more often as
problematic than contemporaries with a serious form of
spina bifida [77]. Likewise, in the study of Seller (1990)
[65], eight patients ended up with minimal handicaps,
having bony lesions in the thoracic (one patient), lumbar
(two patients), and lumbosacral (five patients) spine. Three
others with lumbosacral bony lesions were among the most
gravely handicapped [65]. According to Hetherington
(2005), low lesions do not necessarily indicate a mild
course; physical well-being was not related to the level of
the spinal lesion [31]. Although persons with sacral lesions
showed less impairment compared to persons with higher
spinal lesions, Padua et al. (2002) did not find a correlation
between quality of life (both physical and mental) and the
site of the lesion [54]. According to Pit-ten Cate et al.
(2002), lesion level, type of spina bifida, and gender were
not significantly related to the quality of life in children
with spina bifida [55]. This is in agreement with the results
of the study of Sawin et al. (2002) [62]: no significant
relationship with lesion level, spina bifida severity or shunt
status and quality of life was found in 60 adolescents.
Schoenmakers (2003) [64] concluded that being indepen-
dent in mobility contributes more to quality of life than
other functional abilities such as whether or not being
wheelchair-dependent. And, although children with the
most severe forms of MMC have significantly more and
severe disabilities than children with milder forms of
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MMC, scores about self-esteem did not differ significantly
between the two groups [64].
In conclusion, the level of the lesion does not correlate
with the actual experience of the handicaps themselves.
Is the diagnosis ‘extensive brain damage’ easy to make?
There is little doubt that surgical procedures are unjustified
in hydrocephalic newborns with little or no potential for
independent survival, the decision as to what constitutes as
irreversible and severe brain damage may however be
difficult to make. Ventricular size alone cannot be used as a
conclusive predictive criterion. It has been repeatedly
demonstrated that there is no consistent correlation between
the thickness of the cortex and the eventual psychomotor
development. Barf et. al. (2003) [3] concluded that
cognitive status was especially negatively influenced by
multiple shunt revisions and by other pathologies associat-
ed with hydrocephalus. Amacher and Wellington (1984) [1]
treated 170 children with hydrocephalus in 636 operative
procedures and concluded that “there is no difference in
results based upon measurement of the initial thickness of
the cerebral mantle.” They found normal intelligence in
63% of the 5-year survivors. In a recent study also, Beeker
et al. (2006) described the difficulty in making a reliable
prognosis of the intellectual development based on ventric-
ular size [5].
‘Quality of life’, to conclude
It seems impossible to predict with certainty the future
quality of life of newborns with MMC. One also has to be
aware of the fact that the self-reported quality of life of
children with handicaps does not differ from that of
children without disabilities, and health care professionals
are known to underestimate disabled persons’ quality of life
as compared to self-reports [11]. Generally speaking,
prognostic judgments about quality of life are conceptually
plausible; their failing is simply that, given the available
evidence, they do not appear to be reliable [11]. Finally, and
perhaps the most important, quality of life judgements are
considered as being ethically unacceptable in end-of-life
decisions [45, 46].
Non-discrimination principle
In his Ph.D. thesis, Dorscheidt (2006) raises the issue as to
whether the deliberate termination of the life of disabled
newborns is compatible with the ‘non-discrimination
principle’, in particular the legal prohibition of discrimina-
tion on the ground of disability [19]. Deliberate termination
of the life of newborns with spina bifida is always preceded
by a non-treatment decision (as in the baby Doe case and
the baby Rianne case) and according to Dorscheidt, the
decision of non-treatment should be questioned with regard
to the non-discrimination principle as well. He elaborates
on two fundamental rights of the child, being the child’s
right to life and its right to health(care), mentioned in
international human rights instruments such as the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), The United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
European Convention of Human Rights, and on the
authoritative views of international human rights bodies
such as the United Nations Children’s Rights Committee
(UNCRC) and the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR).
Some examples: Article 25, UDHR: “Everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself, including medical care and the right
to security in the event of disability. All children shall enjoy
the same social protection”. CESCR, par. 26: According to
standard Rules: ”States should ensure that persons with
disabilities, particularly infants and children, are provided
with the same level of medical care within the same system
as other members of society.” UNCRC: “In its examination
of States parties reports, the Committee should commit
itself to highlighting the situation of disabled children and
the need for concrete measures to ensure recognition of
their rights, in particular the right to live, survival and
development”. UN, General Counsel: “We will take all
measures to ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including equal
access to health, education and recreational services, by
children with disabilities and children with special needs, to
ensure the recognition of their dignity, to promote their self-
reliance and to facilitate their active participation in the
community”. Proposal text of the American delegacy for
the UN Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights and
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities: ”States Parties reaffirm
the inherent right to life of all persons with disabilities, shall
take all necessary measures to ensure its effective enjoyment
by them, and shall ensure that disability, or perceived quality
of life, shall not serve as a basis for infringement of the right
to life.” [19]
These international political statements and agreements
are also reflected in the resolution of the International
Federation for Spina Bifida and Hydrocephalus (IF) as
formulated at the 12th International Conference (“The
Right to be Different”) for Hydrocephalus and Spina Bifida
in Toulouse [34]:
1. People with spina bifida and hydrocephalus can live a
full life with equal value to that of any other citizen and
they should not be seen as a medical condition. Their
views should be sought and heard by governments and
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health professionals, who should acknowledge the right
of people with spina bifida and hydrocephalus to speak
for themselves.
2. People with disabilities have the right to aim for lives
as rewarding as those of their peers who have what is
regarded as a normal life. Supportive systems must be
in place when they are needed.
3. Experience over the past 30 years has improved
considerably the medical outcome and the quality of
life of people with spina bifida and hydrocephalus.
4. Most adults with spina bifida underline that their
quality of life is not automatically—and should not be
given as—a reason for abortion [34].
As a recognition of the importance of non-discrimination
on the basis of disability (that is to say, present as well as
expected disability) or (expected) quality of life in deciding
whether or not a newborn child with, e.g., spina bifida
should be treated or whether or not it is justified to
deliberately terminate such a child’s life, Dorscheidt (2006)
recommends to involve the legal concept of ‘objective
justification’ in the medical-decision making process. By
using a particular questionnaire, the physician in charge
may take advantage of this concept when considering (and
deliberating on) how to act properly and professionally.
Through this, the physician can ensure the disabled
newborn child’s rightful claim to equal protection of its
right to life and its right to health(care). Doing so would
offer possibilities to replace the usual doctor-centered
approach of decision making by a more patient-centered
approach as well.
To summarize from another perspective: “Prominent
theories of justice emphasize equality of opportunity for
human experience and development; if society has an
obligation to provide citizens this very broad equality of
opportunity, then it has an obligation to shoulder the
burden of care associated with citizens who have spina
bifida” [11].
Palliative care for untreated newborns with MMC
When a newborn with spina bifida is not treated, discomfort
can be expected in the nearby future caused by the lesion
itself (e.g., by becoming infected), by a subsequent
meningitis/ventriculitis, or by raised intracranial pressure
caused by an untreated hydrocephalus. Therefore, the
decision not to treat should always be accompanied by
offering proper palliative care. It is becoming increasingly
evident that, taken modern palliative techniques in
newborns seriously, pain and discomfort can always be
dealt with in an adequate way [43, 57]. In their article
“Strong opioids in pediatric palliative medicine” Hain et al.
(2005) also stated that “clinical evidence is accumulating
that strong opioids can be used safely and effectively; they
should be used as part of a rational approach to the
management of pain” [28]. This use of strong pain killers is
also highlighted in the recent Oxford Textbook of Palliative
Care for Children [16]. In the highly unlikely event of
Fig. 1 Photograph of the newborn, showing the extensive MMC,
extending from +/− the 4th thoracic vertebra till the midlumbar region
Fig. 2 Photograph at the end of the surgical procedure. The MMC
was closed by making use of extensive rotational flaps together with
free skin grafting
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insufficient effect of modern pain medication, terminal
palliative sedation should be the next step in the palliative
approach [16]. With palliative sedation, the possible
experience itself of discomfort can always be dealt with
adequately. In the “Consensus guidelines on sedation and
analgesia in critically ill children” by Playfor et al. (2006)
in Intensive Care Medicine, some 20 guidelines are
mentioned by which pain and discomfort in critically ill
children can be treated in an efficient way; life termination
not being mentioned at all [56].
Fig. 3 a Comfort scores during the first month of life (min=5: no
discomfort; max=35: extreme discomfort). Green bars: only para-
cetamol (intermittently) being used. Green/black bars: low-dose
morphine together with paracetamol being used. b The same as a,
but now with the VAS (min=0: no pain; max=10: most severe pain)
Note: The combination of a Comfort score of at least 17 and a VAS of
at least 4 indicates that the well-being of the newborn is in jeopardy. In
such a situation, the attending nurse is expected to determine the cause
of the discomfort and to take adequate measures (changing a full
nappy, feeding a hungry child, emptying a full bladder, giving
adequate painkillers if appropriate, etc.) to secure the child’s well-
being
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When it is decided that surgical treatment is not a
feasible option in a newborn with spina bifida, it is regarded
by some to be an act of ‘mercy’ to terminate the life of the
newborn [72]. This notion, however, is a misconception:
they are not terminally ill because of the MMC and/or
hydrocephalus per se; they are ‘terminally ill’ because of
the decision not to treat their congenital malformations. The
needs of these untreated newborns, however, are still the
same as the needs of all newborns: proper care, feeding,
comfort, respect and love; till death (and apparently not
death itself). The ‘need’ for life termination in these
patients can only be regarded as an indication of insuffi-
cient palliative care. Life termination as an act of mercy can
only be applied to hopeless situations that can occur, e.g.,
on battlegrounds or in mountaineering, when there are no
proper means indeed to alleviate real unbearable suffering.
This is obviously not the case in a modern equipped hospital
(at least, it should not be) with experience in palliative care
and pain management.
This is all confirmed in the paper of Sauer in 2001,
“Ethical dilemmas in neonatology: recommendations of the
Ethics Working Group of the CESP (Confederation of
European Specialists in Pediatrics)” in the European
Journal of Pediatrics [60]. In this paper, some ethical
principles, applicable to every newborn, are being formu-
lated, like: “decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment
should always be accompanied by optimal palliative
therapy and dignified and comforting care” and “every
form of intentional killing should be rejected in paediatrics”
[60]. This is followed by: “However, giving medication to
relieve suffering in hopeless situations which may, as a side
effect, accelerate death, can be justified”.
To date, it is not clear why these recommendations should
not hold for cases of untreated spina bifida and hydrocephalus
in the Netherlands and why the Dutch Association of
Paediatrics does not adopt these recommendations.
Illustrative case
After an uneventful pregnancy, a full-term female child was
delivered spontaneously, Apgar scores being 4 and 5.
Physical examination revealed a huge MMC at high
thoracic level (Fig. 1), a very large head with a large but
soft fontanel, a marked deformation of the thorax with
scoliosis, and clubfeet. After counseling the parents, they
persisted in their wish to treat the child, if this probably
could save her life. The MMC team decided to respect the
parents will and on day 3 the back lesion was closed by the
neurosurgeon in collaboration with the plastic surgeon,
making use of extensive rotational flaps together with free
skin grafting (Fig. 2). Shunt placement could be postponed
till day 9; a medium pressure valve being used. Because
postoperatively the fontanel did not soften adequately,
2 weeks later the medium pressure valve was changed in
a low-pressure valve, now with satisfying clinical results.
All period long, from birth till 1 week after the shunt
revision, the well-being of the baby was estimated by
making use of the Comfort score and the VAS and also
medication used for treatment of pain or discomfort
(paracetamol and morphine) was recorded (Fig. 3a,b).
Studying these data and particularly the amount of
medication needed, several conclusions can be made:
1. When untreated (the first 3 days), the child was not
discomfortable.
2. Closing of the back lesion, in this case certainly a major
procedure, did not contribute significantly (and only
temporarily) to more discomfort. In other words, closing
of the open spine can be qualified as a proportional
treatment modality.
3. The same holds true for placing a ventricular shunt.
4. Treating an active hydrocephalus adequately contrib-
utes to the well-being of the patient.
5. In 1 month’s time, this active treatment resulted in a
stable situation of overall well-being in this patient.
6. Only paracetamol and low-dose morphine were neces-
sary in the treatment of actual discomfort.
In summary, this case not only demonstrates that there
is no such thing as ‘suffering’ in these newborns, but also
Fig. 4 The same child at 7 months old; fixating and following with
the eyes, vocalizing, normal movements of the arms, moving both legs
vigorously (perhaps nonvoluntary), still being partially fed by a
nasogastric tube
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the incorrectness of the statement of Verhagen et al.
(2005a) [73] that “the suffering of these newborns cannot
be alleviated by any means in a proper medical way”
(Fig. 4). The overall impression of this case is in
accordance with the preliminary results of the Rotterdam
Prospective Study on Discomfort in Newborns with MMC:
there is no “acutely unbearable suffering” in these new-
borns (Figs. 5a,b)
Although in an interview Verhagen himself reported that
“all 22 cases had a lesion of the most severe form, at level
of the neck” [78], in their published articles Verhagen et al.
[73_76] do not quantify the level of the lesion. However, it
seems very unlikely that his statement is correct or that the
levels of lesion in these 22 cases are of the same level and/
or magnitude as in the case described.
Synthesis and conclusion
There is no evidence that newborns with MMC and
hydrocephalus do either ‘suffer’ unbearably or hopelessly
and certainly not without the prospect to relieve this
suffering by standard care. ‘Suffering’ itself is a non-
conclusive, and in newborns, inapplicable denominator that
should not be used anymore in this debate. Although they
will in their future life be confronted with handicaps,
sometimes very severe, their future prospects and their
actual experienced quality of life cannot be predicted with
such certainty at birth that their lives can be regarded as
hopeless or meaningless (‘quality of life judgments’ as such
being unacceptable in this decision making). Possible
discomfort in these newborns can easily be treated in a
Fig. 5 a and b Preliminary results of the Rotterdam Prospective Study on Discomfort in Newborns with MMC (n=13)
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straightforward way by active treatment (closure of the
defect and shunting the hydrocephalus) and, when neces-
sary, by the use of a professional pain/symptom protocol.
The decision not to treat such a newborn, when based on
expected handicaps, possibly violates the ‘non-discrimination’
principle (Dorscheidt, 2006). When not being treated, they are
not terminally ill because of the MMC and/or hydrocephalus
per se; they are ‘terminally ill’ because of this nontreatment
decision. Not being terminally ill, it is not ‘humane’ or ‘mer-
ciful’ to terminate their life, this also being not in accordance
with international legislation and international medical
recommendations.
When untreated and when it is the intention to alleviate
actual discomfort (this question of intent being crucial to a
moral and legal analysis of end-of-life decisions including
active termination of life), this can always be achieved in an
effective way by using one of the widely accepted palliative
protocols. Such a child can and should be cared for in a
respectful and dignified way, providing all its actual needs
(which apparently is not death itself). This being the case,
there is no indication whatsoever for the deliberate
termination of the life of children born with MMC.
While Verhagen et al. (2005, 2006) must be credited for
bringing the discussion about deliberate termination of
newborns in the open, to date, there does not seem to be
much in their qualifications that can be quantified properly,
especially not in cases of MMC, which is prone to quality
of life judgments (and thereby neglecting the needs and
rights of the newborn). To date, the Groningen protocol,
therefore, cannot be regarded as very useful. Being a tool, it
seems to have been changed in a means in itself. To gain
more usefulness, at least it has to be extended in a way as
proposed by Dorscheidt (2006), by adding charts such as
the Comfort Score and the VAS and by adding palliative
medication charts. Thus, it should be changed from a
doctor-centered protocol to a patient-centered protocol.
To throw more light on these end-of-life decisions,
Verhagen et al. should consider to extend their retrospec-
tive study, focusing on the medical aspects of the 22 cases.
Thus, it must be possible to get a basic understanding of
the extent of the malformations themselves, of possible co-
morbidities, whether or not quality of life judgments were
made, how ‘unbearable suffering’ was ascertained, how
palliative care was offered, and why this failed. Such a
study would contribute significantly to the open discus-
sion they propagate. Verhagen is undoubtedly correct in-
deed in his appeal: “It’s time to be honest about the
unbearable suffering endured by newborns with no hope of
a future”. [71]
Finally, to date it remains unclear on what grounds the
Dutch Association of Paediatrics has adopted the Gronin-
gen protocol and why international legislation, international
human rights instruments, and international medical rec-
ommendations appear not to hold for the Netherlands,
especially not in newborns with MMC.
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